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AIKEN, Judge:
Defendant filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ.
P. 12(b)(6) alleging that defendant is immune from liability
pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1).  Defendant's motion is granted
and this case is dismissed.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff filed this case alleging personal injury against
defendant Yahoo! Inc. ("Yahoo!").  Plaintiff's complaint alleges
that plaintiff's former boyfriend engaged in a campaign to harass
the plaintiff using the Internet by setting up a series of online
"profiles."  Profiles are publicly available web pages on which a
person typically displays personal information about herself such
as name, address, age, hobbies, pictures, or other content.  The
profiles at issue contained information about the plaintiff and
appeared to have been posted by her.  These profiles included
nude pictures of the plaintiff and information about how to
contact her at her workplace.  Plaintiff also alleges that her
former boyfriend impersonated plaintiff in discussions in online
chat rooms, "soliciting" other men by directing them to the
unauthorized profiles, which resulted in plaintiff being visited
and harassed at her workplace by various men.
Plaintiff brought suit against Yahoo! alleging that her
former boyfriend used Yahoo!'s Internet-based services to post
the profiles and engage in the chat room conversations. 
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Plaintiff concedes that although Yahoo! had no "initial
responsibility to act," she alleges that Yahoo! assumed a legal
duty to act when one of its employees allegedly told plaintiff
that Yahoo! would "stop" the unauthorized profiles, and that
Yahoo! then failed to fulfill that "duty."
Yahoo! is an interactive computer service provider with
"over 165 million registered users" and "345 million unique
visitors . . . each month.  Complaint, ¶ 10.  Any person with
access to the Internet may, at no charge, register as a Yahoo!
user, obtain an online Yahoo! identifier and account, and then
engage in various online activities, such as sending and
receiving email, participating in Yahoo! chat room discussions,
and posting a self-authorized online "profile."  
Plaintiff alleges that she tried for several months to get
Yahoo! to remove the allegedly unauthorized profiles. 
Specifically, beginning in January 2005, on several occasions,
plaintiff "mailed . . . a signed statement" to Yahoo! "denying
any involvement with the unauthorized profiles" and asking Yahoo!
to "remove" them.  Complaint, ¶¶ 4-6.  Each time, Yahoo!
allegedly "did not respond."  Id.  Nearly three months later, at
the end of March, plaintiff's former boyfriend's actions were
continuing so plaintiff contacted a local Portland news program,
who decided to publicize a report about plaintiff's situation. 
Complaint, ¶ 7.  Plaintiff alleges that the upcoming news report
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"precipitated" a telephone call from Mary Osako, a Yahoo!
employee, to the plaintiff.  Id.  Plaintiff alleges that Ms.
Osako asked plaintiff to fax her the statements about this
problem including any statements that plaintiff had previously
sent to Yahoo!.  Plaintiff alleges that Osako pledged that she
would "walk the statements over to the division responsible for
stopping unauthorized profiles" and that "Yahoo! would put a stop
to the unauthorized profiles."  Id.
Plaintiff alleges that once Osako undertook to assist her,
Yahoo! "assumed an affirmative duty to do so with care."  Id. at
¶ 7.  Plaintiff alleges that Yahoo! breached that duty when it
"negligently and carelessly failed to remove the unauthorized
profiles and prohibit them from being posted again."  Id. at ¶ 9. 
Plaintiff further alleges that because she relied on Yahoo! to
provide assistance, she "made no other arrangements for
assistance."  Id. at ¶ 8.  
STANDARDS
Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), dismissal for failure to
state a claim is proper only when it appears to a certainty that
the plaintiffs can prove no set of facts in support of their
claim that would entitle them to relief.  Litchfield v.
Spielberg, 736 F.2d 1352, 1357 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470
U.S. 1052 (1985).  For the purpose of the motion to dismiss, the
complaint is liberally construed in favor of the plaintiffs, and
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its allegations are taken as true.  Rosen v. Walters, 719 F.2d
1422, 1424 (9th Cir. 1983).
DISCUSSION
Defendant alleges that plaintiff's complaint must be
dismissed due to defendant's immunity from suit pursuant to 47
U.S.C. §§ 230(c)(1), (2)1.  Section 230 generally immunizes
interactive service providers such as Yahoo! from liability for
harm caused by the dissemination of third-party information.  The
legislative history surrounding Congress's creation of § 230
represented the desire to protect online intermediaries from
liability for unlawful third-party content.  Congress reasoned
that any liability would threaten development of the online
industry as a medium for new forms of mass communication and
simultaneously create disincentives to self regulate such content
by service providers.  Congress therefore determined that
liability should rest with the actual wrongdoers - the
originators of the illegal and harmful content - and not
intermediary servers whose systems are sometimes abused by
wrongdoers.  
There can be no dispute that in the nine years since Section
230 was enacted that courts across the country have held that
Section 230 generally bars claims that seek to hold the provider
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of an interactive computer service liable for tortuous or
unlawful information that someone else disseminates using that
service.  In Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018 (9th Cir. 2003), the
court noted that "Congress . . . has chosen for policy reasons to
immunize from liability for defamatory or obscene speech
'providers and users of interactive computer services' when the 
. . . material is provided by someone else."  Id. at 1020. 
Batzel noted that it was "join[ing] the consensus developing
across other courts of appeal that § 230(c) provides broad
immunity for publishing content provided primarily by third
parties."  Id.  Similarly, in Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc.,
339 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2003), the court noted that "under the
statutory scheme, an 'interactive computer service' qualifies for
immunity so long as it does not also function as an 'information 
content provider' for the portion of the statement or publication
at issue."  Id. at 1123.  See also, Zeran v. America Online,
Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 328 (4th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 524 U.S.
937 (1998)("Section 230 . . . plainly immunizes computer service
providers like AOL from liability for information that originates
with third parties"); and Roskowski v. Corvallis Police Officers'
Ass'n., Civ. No. 03-474-AS, 2005 WL 555398 (D. Or. 2005)(Section
230 immunizes website operators from claims based on information
that users posted directly to the operators' sites).  
Plaintiff here attempts to distinguish her claim from one
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falling under § 230 by asserting that she is not seeking to hold
defendant liable as a publisher of third-party information; 
instead plaintiff argues that her claim falls under the
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 323 as an Oregon torts claim. 
Section 323 provides:
One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, 
to render services to another which he should recognize
as necessary for the protection of the other's person
or things, is subject to liability to the other for
physical harm resulting from his failure to exercise
reasonable care to perform his undertaking, if:
(a) his failure to exercise such care increases the 
risk of such harm, or
(b) the harm is suffered because of the other's reliance
upon the undertaking.
Id.
Plaintiff argues that she relied upon defendant's
"assumption of its affirmative duty" to remove the unauthorized
profiles from its website.  Plaintiff's Response, p. 5. 
Specifically, plaintiff alleges that defendant failed to exercise
reasonable care in performing this undertaking, as the
unauthorized profiles remained on the website for three months
"after [defendant] undertook this duty."  Id.  Plaintiff alleges
that it was not until she brought this lawsuit that the profiles
were finally removed.  In essence, plaintiff is seeking to hold
defendant liable for the injuries she allegedly sustained as the
result of defendant's "failure to fulfil its promise to remove
the unauthorized profiles."  Id. at p. 9.  
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Plaintiff relies on several Oregon tort cases where an actor
undertook a duty, the actor was then negligent in performing that
duty, resulting in negligence which ultimately caused plaintiff
injury.   See Arney v. Baird, 62 Or.App. 643, 645-47, 651, 661
P.2d 1364, rev. denied, 295 Or. 446, 668 P.2d 382 (1983)(tow
truck driver instructed plaintiff to move a cone that was set up
to secure the accident scene, plaintiff was hit by a car.  Court
held tow truck driver and service station were initially under no
obligation to help plaintiff, however, once they undertook that
obligation "they assumed the duty of performing the task with
reasonable care.  Court held trial court did not err in
submitting these allegations to the jury.).
Plaintiff's case is distinguishable from the Oregon tort
cases relied on by plaintiff due to the protection afforded
defendant by § 230.  Specifically, this case is controlled by
Ninth Circuit law holding that § 230 provides service providers
such as defendant with "broad immunity for publishing content
provided primarily by third parties."  Carafano, 339 F.3d at
1123.  The facts here are similar to the facts in Zeran where the
plaintiff also alleged that when he contacted America Online
(AOL) to demand that the internet postings be removed, he was
allegedly "assured" by a "company representative . . . that the
posting would be removed."  129 F.3d at 329.  When the harassment
continued, plaintiff brought suit alleging that AOL was negligent
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in failing to act quickly enough and in preventing any further
similar postings.  The Fourth Circuit rejected Zeran's claim
holding that because he was seeking to hold the service provider
liable based on injuries allegedly resulting from the
dissemination of third-party content, his claim necessarily and
impermissible sought to treat the service provider as "publisher"
of that content, regardless of the particular label attached to
the claim.  Id. at 327.  The court therefore found AOL immune
from suit.
Plaintiff's allegations similarly fall under the broad
immunity provided internet servers by § 230.  Plaintiff alleges
she was harmed by third-party content, and that the service
provider [defendant] allegedly breached a common law or statutory
duty to block, screen, remove, or otherwise edit that content. 
Any such claim by plaintiff necessarily treats the service
provider as "publisher" of the content and is therefore barred by
§ 230.  Plaintiff's argument that she seeks to hold defendant
liable only for its alleged "failure to fulfil its promise to
remove the unauthorized profiles," does not remove this case from
the immunity provided by § 230.  Plaintiff's claim remains an
effort to hold the service provider liable for failing to perform
the duties of a publisher, such as screening or removing third-
party content.   See also, Schneider v. Amazon.com, Inc., 108
Wash.App. 454, 31 P.3d 37, 41-43 (2001)(court rejected
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plaintiff's claim that defendant "promised to remove" allegedly
tortuous reviews, but then "failed to do so, and reposted the
reviews rather than deleting them."  Court held that § 230 barred
plaintiff's claim because the "broken promise" claims were based
on an alleged "failure to remove the posting," and therefore
based on defendant's "exercise of editorial discretion" subject
to § 230's prohibition on publisher liability).
CONCLUSION
Defendant's motion to dismiss (doc. 9) is granted.  Further,
defendant's request for oral argument is denied as unnecessary. 
This case is dismissed and all pending motions are denied as
moot.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated this  8  day of November 2005.
                                     /s/ Ann Aiken        
                                      Ann Aiken
                            United States District Judge
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